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 “Alignment” as an ordering principle for understanding the Indo-Pacific 
security landscape
H
ow to gain analytical purchase on the “big picture” of the extraordinarily complex 
security dynamics Indo-Pacific region is one of the greatest challenges faced by 
strategic analysts. And while policy-maker’s attention is understandably captured 
by immediate events and pressing issues, this can sometimes come at the expense 
of deeper reflection upon the underlying structural drivers of Indo-Pacific security dynamics. 
Nevertheless, it is crucially important for long-term strategic planning purposes to delve into the 
deeper security “structures” that animate state cooperation and conflict, and which consequently 
define and shape the region’s security order.  Studies with this aim in view usually tend to focus 
upon the tangible institutions that constitute the region’s so-called “security architecture”; by 
which we mean the institutional security mechanisms that contribute toward security governance, 
or otherwise superintend individual or collective security to states. 
The so-called “noodle bowl” of regional agreements, regimes, and institutions in the 
Indo-Pacific encompasses everything from economic forums such as Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation(APEC), inter-regional meetings, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and 
Track II dialogues such as Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSACP), and 
everything in-between, making any attempt to impose some kind of schematic for properly 
comprehending this security architecture a daunting task. But in addition to the insurmountable 
complexity of the problem, the “security architecture” notion fails to recognise the inherent 
qualitative differentiation between its various constituents, usually lumping together multilateral 
Abstract
Strategic analysts and scholars have consistently searched for the best macro-level 
intellectual frameworks to capture the security dynamics of the complex Asia/Indo-
Pacific region. Instead of following the common practice of cataloguing and appraising 
the wide variety of institutions that comprise the region’s so-called “security architecture” 
(a problematic construct; as will be revealed), this article proposes that the structural 
dynamics of the region’s security can be better apprehended through the specific concept of 
“alignment.” From this perspective it is argued that three relatively well-defined alignment 
“blocs”: the US alliance network, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strategic 
partnership network and the ASEAN security community serve to influence and structure 
strategic interactions across the region. By examining the internal composition, purpose, 
and behaviors of these alignment groupings―and the challenges they each face―we can 
gain new insights into how the consequent regional security order is produced.
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security dialogue mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or East Asia Summit 
(EAS), (often referred to as “talk shops”), with formal military alliance pacts that include joint 
defence planning, such as the Japan-US Alliance, or ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-US).  These 
examples should on no account be conflated, as the former contain an inclusive range of states, 
often working at cross-purposes, whilst striving toward confidence building measures, whereas 
the latter represent an exclusive alignment of states working toward mutually shared security and 
defence objectives, including joint military planning.  
In a bid to disaggregate these two “unlike” forms of security architecture, and based 
on an extensive pan-regional study undertaken for the monograph Security in Asia Pacific: 
The Dynamics of Alignment, this article introduces the notion of “security alignment” as an 
alternative approach toward capturing the structural characteristics of the current Indo-Pacific 
security environment.1  “Security alignment” refers to a genuine and committed effort by states 
to coordinate their security strategies.  It will invariably manifest itself in some identifiable 
institutional form―whether this be a formal military alliance, or another form of exclusive 
organization, (including some plurilateral security institutions with exclusive, rather than inclusive 
membership).  Indeed, while the alliance paradigm of alignment has traditionally been a dominant 
form, the phenomenon is not confined to these alone, and includes coalitions, ententes, strategic 
partnerships and security communities, among others. Naturally, some forms of alignment will be 
tighter and more developed than other looser arrangements: not all alignments take the form of 
“alliances” (but all alliances are alignments). 
The key point is that alignment partners basically subscribe to a common set of security 
objectives, coordinate their resources closely toward these, and do not admit “outsiders” to their 
exclusive “club,” thus differentiating them from region’s multitude inclusive security dialogue 
forums (though all alignments, including alliances, are institutionalised).  Moreover, when aligned 
states act together as holistic “units,” they are frequently  in competitive tension with one another 
in terms of their respective security goals (though this does not preclude elements of cooperation, 
including by individual member states).  Using alignment as a reductionist perspective to allow 
us to get behind the vast proliferation of regional institutions and diverse state actors promises to 
simplify (reify) our understanding of the larger question of security structures in the Indo-Pacific. 
Indeed, the phenomenon itself has traditionally been held as fundamental to the understanding 
international politics by an array of seminal scholars in the International Relations discipline.  As 
prolific alliance scholar George Liska attests: “Alignments are always instrumental in structuring 
the state system, sometimes transforming it.”2  
The Indo-Pacific security structure: three power centers of alignment
On the basis of these criteria, the US hub-and-spoke (H&S) alliance system, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) strategic partnership, and the ASEAN security community―
but not its extended organs, such as the ARF/EAS―generally fulfil these criteria of alignment 
(though some caveats appear).  At their core, they are all largely exclusive organizations, 
and each acts as a vehicle to provide security for its membership through coordinated policy 
objectives aimed at both internal and external security challenges, even if the institutional form 
of security cooperation―alliance, strategic partnership, and security community, dif fers in 
each case.  These alignment groupings are different in their nature, purpose, design, internal 
dynamics, and external orientations, as will be demonstrated below. Moreover, it is these three 
alignment groupings that characterise the structural security landscape of the Indo-Pacific 
1  Thomas S. Wilkins, Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2019).
2  George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1962), p. 12.
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region, with each holds a competing “vision” for the future of regional order.  Thus, as exclusive 
alignments, each of the three stands out as a “pole” of power and attraction, putting forward their 
own distinct visions of regional order and seeking adhesion to this among other external states. 
On the one hand, we have the Washington-led H&S alignment of maritime liberal democracies in 
the Pacific, backed by American military predominance. Standing in contrast to this is the Sino-
Russian authoritarian compact at the heart of the SCO, backed by Beijing’s cascade of Eurasian 
economic initiatives and institution building, alongside Moscow’s superpower nuclear arsenal. 
Juxtaposed with these two rivalrous blocs are the ASEAN countries seeking to retain their 
“centrality” in regional security discourses and governance through their expansive institutional 
and normative framework (The “ASEAN way”).  Together, these three alignments largely define 
the security structure of the Indo-Pacific region.
Notably, as each alignment grouping seeks to expand its power and influence over the 
regional order it has developed “networks” with external parties, extraneous to their core 
membership, and even across other alignments, to further its aims.  These networking attempts 
could be conceived of as  an “H&S plus,” “SCO-plus,” and “ASEAN-plus” configurations. With 
these parameters in mind, let us now unpack each of the three alignment groupings that define 
the overall structure of the Indo-Pacific security landscape: the US-alliance network, SCO 
strategic partnership network, and ASEAN security community network in turn, to probe into 
their background, nature, activities, and the challenges they each face going forward.  (Note 
that the analyses below are merely “snapshots” of these alignments, and the book Security in 
Asia Pacific above, may be consulted for fully detailed accounts.)  And while it should be noted 
that “alliances” such as the US H&S system have typically taken center stage in both academic 
and policy analyses, this article seeks to draw attention to the SCO and ASEAN as alternative, 
specifically-“non-alliance,” pathways toward security alignment.
The US alliance network
The US hub-and-spokes system of alliances was developed at the time of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in 1951, with the foundation of the Japan-US alliance and the ANZUS alliance, and US-
Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty.  This was later extended to alliance pacts with South Korea 
(1953), Thailand (1954), and Taiwan (1954: now defunct and replaced with Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA)).  It represents the strongest form of security alignment in the region, founded as it is 
upon a range of formal military security guarantees, including a commitment to joint defence. As 
such, these security alignments closely conform to Robert Osgood’s definition of an alliance as 
“a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against 
a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to 
consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force in specified circumstances.”3 
As Victor Cha has written, at the inception of the H&S Washington preferred a series of 
bilateral alliance pacts to a multilateral structure such as NATO, though this preference has now 
been eroded as policy-makers have sought to reform the H&S system to meet new challenges 
in the 21st Century.4  Today, the H&S alliances are being transformed in line with internal and 
external pressures.  Nevertheless, cooperation between “core allies”―Japan and Australia―and 
the US has been greatly augmented.  Not only have Tokyo and Canberra individually deepened 
their alliance relations with the US through deeper military integration and security cooperation 
under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision, but they have also initiated direct bilateral 
3  Robert Endicott Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1968), p. 17.
4  Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2016).
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security cooperation by means of their own security alignment, (dubbed a “Special Strategic 
Partnership”).5  This process is further triangulated through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 
(TSD) process between the three allies, arguably adding up to a “virtual trilateral alliance.”  In 
addition to the strengthening and consolidation of the alliance “core,” the hub-and-spokes has 
taken on a “networking” aspect.  Washington has not only encouraged contacts between the 
“spokes”―such as Japan and Australia, and with elusive success; Korea and Japan―but new 
“strategic partners” have been sought as affiliates to the existing H&S network.  Among these 
potential adherents to the US-alliance network is India, which has been brought into the “Quad” 
process (and FOIP), but also key South East Asian (SEA) states such as Vietnam and Singapore.
With its origins as a set of formal military alliances, the US-alliance network, was originally 
designed to counter the Cold War threat emanating from the Communist bloc.  With the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991 and the subsequent integration of the PRC into the capitalist world economy 
since then, these alliances were adrift and “threatless” for most of the Post–Cold War period.  New 
life was breathed into the US-alliance network after the 2001 terrorist attacks as Asian allies were 
co-opted by Washington to provide military support for the “war on terror.”  By 2011, Washington 
had begun to view its military interventions in the Middle East as costly diversion away from the 
evident locus of geopolitical power centering on the Indo-Pacific.  The “pivot” (or “rebalance”) 
policy of the Obama Administration sought to refocus attention back to this crucial region.6  This 
policy shift was in response to increase Chinese assertiveness in the region, exemplified by 
its rapid military modernisation and its assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS).  Now, the 
Trump-era National Security Strategy (2017) makes explicit the return of “great power rivalry” 
with a risen China and a resurgent Russia, with an ever provocative nuclear-armed North Korea 
in the background.  The US has thus begun to push back more forcefully against these actors, 
which have both shown a disregard for internal norms and law and seek to pressure the US and 
its allies through an array of “disruptive” policies and “hybrid warfare” techniques.7  The original 
raison d’être of the alliance system of balancing potential great power threats has apparently 
resurfaced accompanied by talk of a “new Cold War.”
But the alliance has also concentrated upon renewing the normative legacy of the so-called “San 
Francisco system” that has always accompanied the actual military alliance dyads themselves.8 
During the Cold War American military predominance, extended through its alliance network, 
imposed peace  and stability upon the region, allowing for East Asian states to focus upon rapid 
economic advancement, as well as supplying a variety of “public goods” such as freedom of the 
seas.  This US-imposed regional order served the security interests of allies, (and some non-
allies), well until the beginning of the 21st Century.  Yet, as this San Francisco system has been 
eroded both by a relative decline in American power, it has been concomitantly challenged by 
ever more disruptive activities by new regional challengers such as North Korea, China, and 
Russia.  As such, renewed efforts are underway by the US and its allies to uphold the liberal 
principles of the de facto “Rules-based order” centered around the principles of free trade, open 
markets, human rights (and support for democratisation).  Such efforts have coalesced into the 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision that unites the core US allies, with India, and which welcomes 
any state that subscribes to its principles.  The shared commitment to maintaining a rules-
5  Thomas Wilkins, “From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance?: Australia-Japan Security Ties and 
the Asia-Pacific”, Asia Policy 20 (2015), pp. 81–112.
6  Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016).
7  Thomas Wilkins, “Australia and Japan Facing ‘Disruptive’ Challenges to the Rules Based Order in the 
Indo-Pacific,” Policy Brief, September 26, 2018.
8  Kimie Hara, The San Francisco System and Its Legacies: Continuation, Transformation and Historical 
Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2015).
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based order based upon US regional primacy unites the US-alliance network in response to its 
challengers that seek to act as “spoilers” of regional order, and revise the status quo through 
coercive and unilateral actions.
However, the US-alliance network faces challenges going forward in upholding both its 
primacy and its vision of regional order.  Firstly, the US no longer enjoys undisputed economic or 
military supremacy, especially in the Indo-Pacific.  Moreover, the abrogation of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) in 2017 and the failure to adequately replace the carefully crafted Pivot/
Rebalance strategy of the previous Administration with a tangible and cohesive regional strategy 
has weakened the props of the US-led alignment.  Instead we have an as yet ill-defined policy of 
“strategic competition.”  Secondly, the Presidency of Donald Trump has rhetorically undercut US 
commitment to its allies by questioning security guarantees and spreading accusations of free-
riding among allies.  This has greatly undermined US credibility among allies and foes alike. 
Paradoxically, however, his demands for increased alliance contributions (in light of limited 
American resources) may actually strengthen the aggregate capabilities at the heart of the US-
alliance network as allies increase their defence budgets and military acquisitions. Lastly, there 
are signs of distancing at the periphery of the original H&S network. It is arguable that both 
Thailand and the Philippines are drifting away from Washington and seeking a closer relationship 
with the PRC, while New Zealand has been officially expelled from ANZUS, and South Korea to 
some extent remains a moribund ally, trapped by its unavoidable focus upon the North Korean 
threat.  These relationships will require political investment and resources to renew to avoid the 
further slippage of these peripheral allies into China’s orbit.
The SCO strategic partnership network
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, spearheaded by Beijing, represents a newly emergent 
security alignment in eastern Eurasia in implicit, if not direct, contention with the H&S network. 
In partnership with Moscow, by means of the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, and with India 
as the latest major power to accede to the organization (2017), the SCO now clearly represents 
an alternate pole of power in the Indo-Pacific and potential challenger to the vision of regional 
order championed by Washington and its allies. The SCO has its origins in the post–Cold War 
rapprochement between erstwhile Communist allies, Russia and China, which was formalised 
in its 1996 Strategic Partnership, and 2001 Treaty of Good neighbourliness and Cooperation.9 
These two events occurred near-simultaneously with the foundation of the “Shanghai Five,” later 
to become the SCO, to include the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan, in an axis of authoritarian Eurasian states.  It was initially created to resolve 
border disputes and mitigate strategic competition between Beijing and Moscow in the Central 
Asian region itself, but soon developed into a formal organization to address a range of joint 
non-traditional security challenges, dubbed the “Three Evils” of terrorism, separatism and 
religious extremism, faced by all parties.  Alarmed by US military intervention in West Asia, the 
organization soon took on anti-hegemonic tones, asserting that American/Western influence 
was to be excluded from this region.  It also began to serve as a platform for the championship 
of a multipolar world order, and an antithesis of Western values, as represented by the maritime 
democracies of the US-alliance network.  Washington’s request for SCO Observer status 
was denied and the organization consolidated itself as an exclusive six-member plurilateral 
arrangement until 2017.  At this point former Observer States India and Pakistan were admitted 
9  “Joint Declaration by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Adopted at Beijing 
on 25 April 1996,” 2 May 1996, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/127, https://undocs.org/
pdf?symbol=en/A/51/127; ‘Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation,’ 24 July 2001, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml.
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to the club, thus significantly expanding the extent of its reach across the whole of eastern 
Eurasia.  In addition, Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia currently hold Observer status, 
whilst Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, are Dialogue Partners, 
thus indicating the “network” facet of the SCO alignment, and clearly demonstrating its powers of 
“attraction” for other regional states.
The eight full members with China and Russia (and now India) at its core, account for 
approximately half the world’s population, about 80% of the Eurasian Landmass, a quarter of 
world GDP and around 20% of total world military expenditure.10  The SCO bloc stretches 
across the “Heartland” of the Eurasian continent, thus providing a geopolitical counterweight 
to the “Rimland” of US maritime allies.  It is frequently mischaracterised as an “Asian NATO” or 
“alliance of the East,” but this fails to capture its novelty as an organization which superintends 
a “web” of bilateral strategic partnerships between the members.  And whilst it includes a high 
degree of security cooperation on both traditional and non-traditional security threats, it does not 
entail a mutual defence pact (as per alliances).  Thus, it conforms to the definition of a strategic 
partnership as “a form of enhanced bilateral cooperation between two states (or other actors) 
that brings them into closer alignment on security and economic issues in order to reduce 
uncertainties and aggregate joint capabilities.”11  In addition to the web of strategic partnerships 
upon which it rests, an intricate organizational apparatus has been fabricated, including a Heads 
of State Council and a Heads of Government Council; the highest decision-making bodies, and 
two permanent organs; the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).  It 
now operates across a range of diplomatic, security, economic, (including joint energy projects, 
new financial architecture, and development funds), intelligence, cyber, and even social-cultural, 
areas.  It therefore represents a new and, in some ways, “hybrid” form of security alignment, quite 
distinct from alliances.
Until the present, the organization has been dominated by China, with Russia as a nominal 
co-equal leader (though the accession of India will potentially dilute this influence), and has 
been seen by many analysts as the prototype of the kind of institutional apparatus that accurately 
reflects Chinese values and interests. According to Swagata Saha “China has been attempting 
to shape a non-Western security grouping to counterbalance NATO and allow China more room 
for military action in Asia.”12  Thus, the SCO in some ways serves as a backstop to Chinese 
outward assertiveness directed toward its Asian neighbours (e.g. SCS, Taiwan, Japan), whilst 
covering Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe. Though the internal parties (excepting India-
Pakistan) have amicably resolved their border disputes, both China and Russia have territorial 
disputes with their Asian neighbours (e.g. Northern Territories, SCS). And while the SCO 
claims to prioritise non-traditional security issues (the “Three Evils”) it engages in high-intensity 
warfighting exercises (“Peace Missions”) involving frontline military capabilities (with a degree 
of inter-operability between members states forces, centered upon Russian weapon platforms, 
or variants thereof).  On the basis of such activities it aims to advance an alternative to Western 
ideology, with Russia and China cooperating diplomatically (through the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC)) to advance a multipolar order and resist the liberal international order 
represented by the US and its allies.  Its internal system principle is based upon the “Shanghai 
Spirit”―a set of internal norms that guide its interaction with external parties.  According to 
10  World Bank, “Data-GDP (current US$) 2018,” https://data.worldbank.org; Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
11  Thomas S. Wilkins, Security in Asia Pacific: The Dynamics of Alignment (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2019), 
p. 125.
12  Swagata Saha, “The Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” East Asia Forum, 17 October 
2014.
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the SCO Charter, this encompasses: “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal 
affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military 
superiority in adjacent areas.”13  Though it claims not to target any other country, in reality, this 
represents an effort to challenge and revise the international order in line with the preferences 
of the authoritarian powers, and to mask active efforts to destabilize the US rules-based order 
above.
But despite its formidable potential, and clear representation as an alternative pole of power 
to the US H&S network, the organization faces significant internal challenges.  Firstly, the recent 
expansion to include India (and Pakistan), weakens Beijing’s heretofore dominant position as 
de facto leader of the SCO.  Instead of a Sino-Russian leadership dyad at the core, now India will 
make it a triad. And though New Delhi subscribes to certain aspects of the SCO worldview such 
as multi-polarity, and shares notions of non-interference and the dangers of the “Three Evils”, 
India is a democracy in many ways closer to Western traditions, and which, despite its now 
misnomered “non-alignment” policy, is closely aligned with the extended US-alliance network as 
well.  Moreover, China and India (Arunachal Pradesh), as well as India and Pakistan (Kashmir), 
have territorial disputes, that could threaten the internal integrity of the SCO. Whether this 
will weaken the SCO’s cohesion, and whether it will transform it into a less effective and united 
multilateral security dialogue forum (“talk shop”), instead of a coherent alignment bloc, remains 
to be seen.  Secondly, the importation of the “Indo-Pak” problem―the fact that two members are 
actually antagonists, rather than allied or aligned, threatens to undermine the internal security 
of the SCO in potentially combustible ways.  Lastly, Western analysts in particular have pointed 
out that the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, heretofore the “engine” of the SCO is also riven 
with contradictions, with Moscow fearing an increased Chinese strategic presence on its borders 
and in Central Asia, and resentful of Chinese economic expansion, sometimes outside of the 
SCO framework, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which vies with the Russian-led 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).  This indicates that the alignment functions as much as a “pact 
of restraint”―preventing one another from aligning with the US, for example, than a genuine 
confluence of long-term strategic interests, let alone, shared values.
The ASEAN security community network
In some ways caught in-between the Sino-US-led “blocs,” the ASEAN security community seeks 
to drive internal (intramural) cooperation between South East Asian (SEA) states and safeguard 
their mutual external interests through strength in numbers.  ASEAN was initially formed as a 
regional intergovernmental organization in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, to protect itself 
against outside interventions by the Communist powers (Vietnam, China) who threatened to 
destabilise newly independent but fragile post-colonial states faced with a multitude of internal 
nation-building challenges.  With the end of the Cold War tension in SEA, the organization 
experienced a “second birth” with the accession of formerly antagonistic CLMV states in the 
1990s (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam).  Based upon the ASEAN Charter (2007) and 
under the (current) banner of “ASEAN 2020” it aims at building an “ASEAN Community” based 
upon a tripod of: Political-Security community (of most relevance here), Economic community, 
and Socio-cultural community.  Under this triad it engages in a range of intergovernmental 
cooperation and facilitates economic (including an ASEAN Free Trade Area), political, security, 
military, educational, and sociocultural integration activities.  There is no simple definition of a 
“security community,” but Raimo Väyrynen defines it as “a collective arrangement in which its 
members have reasons to trust that the use of military and economic coercion in their mutual 
13  Shanghai Cooperation Organization, “Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” p. 3.
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relations is unlikely.”14  In other words, though they specifically eschew a collective defence pact 
(as per alliance), they conceive of their security as being advanced collectively.  This makes this 
form of security alignment, quite distinguishable from the alliance paradigm.
Though ASEAN was primarily concerned with incubating intramural cooperation between 
its membership until the 1990s, it henceforth took on an external orientation as a discernible 
alignment of states, seeking to shape the wider regional security order in the Indo-Pacific.  This 
“network” building, (usually referred to as “ASEAN-plus”) is conducted by means of a wide array 
of multilateral institutions (i.e. security architecture) that engage with external parties, such 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3, and ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting+ (ADMM+), plus the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).  Through 
this extended network the ASEAN members themselves seek to “enmesh” other regional states, 
especially the major powers, in their own normative framework (see below).
ASEAN is primarily a vehicle to safeguard the security interests of the small and medium-
sized SEA member states both internally and externally, through intramural cooperation, and 
strength in numbers, respectively.  When combined they count a population of approximately 651 
million and aggregated GDP of about $3trn and total military budget of $40bn.15  They employ 
the organization and its extended institutional network as a “shield” against external interference 
in SEA, and as a way of mediating tensions between SEA and external powers, including the 
former two alignment blocs, with varying degrees of success.  They also prioritise non-traditional 
security issues such as transnational crime, unregulated population movements, environmental 
disasters, infectious diseases, food security, transnational pollution, piracy, and terrorism.  They 
have championed a package of “norms,” in part an assertion of “Asian” versus “Western” values, 
known as the “ASEAN Way.”  This entails “the importance of neutrality; sovereignty and territorial 
integrity; the peaceful settlement of disputes; informal, non-confrontational negotiations; and the 
promotion of domestic stability and social harmony―which together underscore the importance 
of state autonomy and non-interference in the affairs of other states.”16  And they have sought 
to “export” these norms across the larger Indo-Pacific theatre by means of their ASEAN-plus 
institutional architecture, including gaining external states adhesion to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC); a loose form of non-aggression pact. This attempt to “enmesh” external 
parties in an ASEAN-led normative framework―lacking the military or economic weight to 
otherwise influence external states―has had some limited success in underwriting their claim to 
“ASEAN centrality” in regional security affairs.
But the ASEAN security community suffers from a range of limitations as a pole of alignment 
in the Indo-Pacific.  Firstly, it lacks the critical mass of power resources and capabilities to assert 
its influence in the face of any opposition by the other alignment blocs, or individual powerful 
states.  In particular, despite some aspirations to integrate SEA’s defence industries, it has no 
collective defence agreement or combined military capabilities, as in the H&S (and to a minor 
degree, in the SCO).  For this reason, it has devoted its security diplomacy toward normative 
efforts at confidence-building and cooperation through the medium of ASEAN-plus institutions 
as a means to shape regional order.  Secondly, perhaps because of these issues, ASEAN (and 
its extended network) have come in for sustained criticism for a lack of effectiveness in the 
security sphere.  The ASEAN-plus institutions are not seen as efficient security providers by 
14  Raimo Väyrynen, Stable Peace through Security Communities?: Steps towards Theory-Building (The Joan 
B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2000), p.166.
15  World Bank, “Data-GDP (current US$) 2018,” https://data.worldbank.org; Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
16  Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN Alternative? Ideas, Institutions and the Challenge to ‘Global’ Governance,” 
The Pacific Review 21, no. 4 (2008), p. 451.
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regional parties, including its members states, who retain national defence capabilities and a 
gamut of security agreements with external powers, especially the US (some can be counted as 
part of the original H&S, such as Thailand and the Philippines, as well as new strategic partners 
in the extended network, such as Singapore and Vietnam, for example).  ASEAN organs have 
not successfully addressed even non-traditional security challenges in the region such as haze 
pollution, the refugee crisis in Myanmar, and human rights concerns, though they have had 
greater success on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy operations.  They have certainly failed to 
deal with traditional security disputes such as the SCS as a meaningful alignment of states. Lastly, 
questions remain as to the sustained momentum of ASEAN toward its aspiration to become a 
genuine “Security Community,” both due to the stark diversity in political makeup and national 
power between its members, and some minor territorial disputes between member states (e.g. 
Preah Vihear temple, between Thailand and Cambodia).  But external factors have placed 
pressure upon its proclaimed “neutrality” toward great power rivalry and territorial disputes in 
the region. Examples of compromised neutrality include Cambodia’s scuttling of the 2016 ASEAN 
Summit declaration regarding the SCS as a result of Chinese diplomatic pressure on Phnom 
Penh.17  This cruelly exposed the divisions within the ASEAN membership and its inability to 
act cohesively as a united front, thus calling into question the actual coherence of ASEAN as a 
meaningful security alignment.
Conclusion
It is conventional wisdom among analysts that the “noodle-bowl” of multilateral institutions of 
various stripes have not been fully effective in addressing the pressing multifarious challenges the 
region faces: great power rivalry, nuclear proliferation, maritime and territorial disputes (though 
it may fare better at dealing with non-traditional security issues such as piracy, and trans-national 
criminal organizations).  Nor have sporadic efforts to build a “regional community” (sometimes 
predicated upon institutional security architecture) fared any better.  One thinks of the failed “East 
Asian Community” of former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, or the “Asia-Pacific Community” of 
former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, for example.  
Thus, in place of these, this ar ticle has suggested that looking at the three principle 
alignment groupings in the region is an alternative to understanding how security in the 
regional is structured and operates to maintain regional order.  The strong adherence of states 
within these alignments to each of these groupings also testifies that they normally prioritise 
their alignments as their most effective form of security provision in an uncertain and unstable 
security environment.  As this article has demonstrated, these new alignments can take the 
form of reconfigured alliances in the US case, or hybrid strategic partnership/plurilaterals, 
like the SCO, or security communities, in the ASEAN case.  In other words, security alignment 
does not always and only occur through formal military alliances, but through alternative “non-
alliance” means, such as the SCO and ASEAN.  Additionally, the reach of these three alignment 
groupings is extended, by their respective efforts to “network” beyond their core memberships. 
For example: the American-led H&S system seeks to attract additional “strategic partners” (e.g. 
Singapore, Vietnam, India), whilst the SCO includes a range of Observer and Dialogue Partners, 
and ASEAN heads a suite of “ASEAN plus” institutional offshoots (e.g. EAS, ARF etc.).  It is also 
important to recognise that alignments can vary in depth and cohesion over time, and can evolve 
and transform.  Moreover alignments are not always “water-tight,” with some states participating 
in multiple alignments (e.g. India is a member of the SCO and a Strategic Partner with the US/
Quad), thus complicating the situation.  Also, interestingly the SCO and ASEAN also increasingly 
17  Manuel Mogato, Michael Martina, Ben Blanchard, “ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia 
Blocks Statement,” Reuters, 25 July 2016.
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engage in cooperative activities, and partially share a similar worldview.18 A recognition of 
importance of the alignment phenomenon for understanding the security landscape of the Indo-
Pacific, as well as an appreciation of the transforming nature of alignments themselves, gets us 
closer to understanding the security structures upon which regional security order is ultimately 
predicated.
18  “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN Secretariat) and the Secretariat of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO Secretariat),” 
21 April 2005, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/ASEAN-SCO-MOU.pdf.
